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Abstract 
In 2018, De Los Reyes and Langer expanded the scope of the Evidence Base Updates 
series to include reviews of psychological assessment techniques. In keeping with the goal of 
offering clear "take-home messages" about the evidence underlying the technique, experts have 
proposed a rubric for evaluating the reliability and validity support. Changes in the research 
environment and pressures in the peer review process, as well as a lack of familiarity with some 
statistical methods, have created a situation where many findings that appear “excellent” in the 
rubric are likely to be “too good to be true,” in the sense that they are unlikely to generalize to 
clinical settings or are unlikely to be reproduced in independent samples. We describe several 
common scenarios where published results are often too good to be true, including internal 
consistency, inter-rater reliability, correlation, standardized mean differences, diagnostic 
accuracy, and global model fit statistics. Simple practices could go a long way towards 
improving design, reporting, and interpretation of findings. When effect sizes are in the 
“excellent” range for issues that have been challenging, scrutinize before celebrating. When 
benchmarks are available base on theory or meta-analyses, results that are moderately better than 
expected in the favorable direction (i.e., Cohen’s q≥+.30) also invite critical appraisal and 
replication before application. If readers and reviewers pull for transparency and do not unduly 
penalize authors who provide it, then change in research quality will be faster and both 
generalizability and reproducibility are likely to benefit. 
 
Keywords: Psychometrics, reliability, validity, fit statistics, prediction 
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Is the Finding Too Good to Be True?  
Moving from “More Is Better” to Thinking in Terms of Simple Predictions and Credibility 
Many results are too good to be true. By this, we mean that they should not be accepted 
uncritically; even more, we advocate a mindset that combines curiosity with gentle skepticism. 
Results are too good to be true if they are unlikely to replicate, or if they will not generalize to 
situations with implications in clinical practice or policy. They could be exaggerated by clerical 
error, p-hacking, aspects of the research design, or simply assuming that “more is better” with all 
of our psychometric statistics, as opposed to thinking in terms of trade-offs and balancing of 
competing goals.  
Existing conventions evolved for a reason, in much the same manner as our taste 
preferences served an adaptive function during evolutionary history. The p < .05 criterion grew 
out of a dialog between Fisher and colleagues as he was evaluating the effects of independent 
variables on agricultural production. The pace of research was slow. It took a season to grow a 
crop, and there were physical constraints on the size of the fields and number of plants. Results 
were calculated and checked by hand and compared to published tables of critical values (so .05 
and .01 might be the only options, if those were all that was published in a reference work). 
Cohen’s conventions for small, medium, and large effect sizes were based in large part on 
reviewing a year’s worth of published articles in a leading journal of social psychology and 
another from clinical psychology in the 1970s. It is difficult to trace origin of the rule of thumb 
for Cronbach’s alpha of .80 or higher being “good,” but any reasonable effort to find a source 
discovers instead that there are a range of nuanced and informed opinions about it (Cronbach & 
Shavelson, 2004; Feldt, 1969; Nunnally, 1967).  
But the research climate in which these conventions evolved is very different from the 
environment in which we are using them now. Standards from the era of farming—with analyses 
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done by hand, and figures and manuscripts generated by typewriters (e.g., stem and leaf plot) 
(Tukey, 1977) –- now guide our consumption of results in a world with M-Turk, big data, and 
statistical learning algorithms that will run staggering permutations on variable sets orders of 
magnitude larger than anything Fisher, Pearson, or Tukey saw in their lifetimes (James, Witten, 
Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2013). The shifting research environment does not make all the 
conventions obsolete or maladaptive. Just as perceived bitterness evolved to protect us from 
alkali toxins, and still protects us from contaminated food today, many of the statistical 
principles still function. Others may need some adaptation, though. Salt and sugar taste so good 
because they were vital but difficult nutrients to get for millions of years, so reward circuits 
evolved to motivate days’ worth of hunting and gathering now impel us to binge on salty, fatty, 
sugary junk food that exploits our preferences. Psychometric conventions that were tuned in a 
bygone era, combined with systemic incentives to get significant and surprising results, are 
contributing to the proliferation of a junk food quality of science. Results that seem superficially 
tasty lack sustenance.  
Therefore, we need to learn some healthy habits for quickly appraising research findings, 
whether it is as producers of the literature or consumers of it. The goals of this paper include 
reviewing examples where results that might conventionally be considered excellent (Hunsley & 
Mash, 2018) are instead likely to be too good to be true, inviting deeper inquiry rather than 
celebration as a first response. We first look at four types of psychometric coefficients: reliability 
statistics, effect sizes, model fit statistics, and meta-analytic summaries, and we explore instances 
when high coefficients warrant suspicion more often than enthusiasm. Next, we offer ways of 
developing and specifying predictions and expectations using rules of thumb, standardized 
checklists, as well as formal statistical tests, all to help decide whether results are credible. 
Things that are beyond the scope of this paper are various ethical issues, such as deliberately 
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falsifying data, p-hacking and ways of detecting it (for review, see Head, Holman, Lanfear, 
Kahn, & Jennions, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005), or matching the wrong statistical procedure with the 
research question (“Type III Error”). Even when we assume good faith and appropriate choice of 
model, there is still a surprising amount of room for junk food results. Our closing 
recommendations aim to train our sense of taste to promote a healthier information diet. The core 
idea can be distilled into a single sentence, even a single equation, that would lead to big 
progress.  
Reliability 
Reliability refers to the reproducibility of a measurement, which is essential to the 
reproducibility of the results and conclusions based on it. There are different facets of reliability, 
including reproducibility over sets of items (internal consistency, such as split-half, Cronbach’s 
alpha, omega), over time (retest stability), and over judges (inter-rater reliability) (Hunsley & 
Mash, 2018). Generalizability theory points out that other facets are also possible and provides a 
unifying framework of variance decomposition, dividing the score variance “pie” into slices 
attributable to different factors. Item Response Theory (IRT) approaches (including Rasch, 
graded response, and other models) permit a fine grained look at reliability as a function of trait 
level; for example, telling whether the reproducibility of scores is similarly good at low, average, 
or high score ranges. 
In all metrics, a higher value of the coefficient (closer to 1.0) indicates more reliable 
variance in the measurement. The convention is to treat more as better, and rubrics typically 
proceed in a linear fashion from “poor” to “adequate,” “good” and “excellent” (Hunsley & Mash, 
2007). An uncritical focus on maximizing this metric has a variety of unintended consequences.  
Internal Consistency: Rethink Alpha Coefficients >.90 
The downside of maximizing the reliability coefficient is perhaps best known with 
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Cronbach’s alpha. The coefficient is not only a function of the typical correlation between items 
(which conceptually what we want it to measure), but also the length of the scale, and the 
variation between cases included in the sample. Other things being equal, the longer scale will 
have the higher alpha (Cronbach & Shavelson, 2004). Using the alpha as the guiding criterion for 
selecting a measure will thus be at odds with goals such as reducing the length of a battery or 
rater burden, which are key considerations in progress tracking and measurement-based care 
(Streiner, Norman, & Cairney, 2015). See Table 1 for an illustration.  
An alternative to alpha (or any other coefficient that includes the number of items in the 
formula) would be to focus on the average inter-item correlation, or the average corrected item-
total correlation (Streiner et al., 2015). These take scale length out of the reliability equation. 
They are only a partial solution, though. Maximizing the internal consistency may result in 
narrow coverage of the desired construct. Consider two sets of items focused on depression: 
Does the person feel sad? …feel down? …feel depressed? Versus: Does the person feel down? 
…have less energy than usual? …have more trouble sleeping? The second set has the lower 
inter-item correlations (because each item assesses a distinct symptom), but it also has the better 
coverage of the construct. In a clinical setting, the second measure would provide a better sense 
of the severity of depression, and also whether treatment was helping. If the scale were brief 
enough to be tolerated for repeated assessment, though, then the combination of shorter scale 
length and breadth of coverage typically results in a modest looking internal consistency 
estimate. A scale with items that correlate .35 with each other on average would have an alpha of 
.73 in a 5 item version, and .84 in a 10 item version, whereas a five-item set with average inter-
item r=.50 would have an alpha of .83. Researchers or reviewers focused on maximizing alpha 
would be prone to pick the narrower scale, or push for longer scales that might raise response 
burden to levels that increase biased response sets or missing data (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 
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2014).  
A more complete solution would be to use a pair of competing criteria to balance each 
other out. Pairing internal consistency with the correlation with the full length scale is a strategy 
advocated when developing short forms (Smith, McCarthy, & Anderson, 2000). Rearranging the 
Spearman-Brown prophecy formula makes it possible to project the reliability of a typical short 
form based on the alpha of the full length version; we can then look for a scale that has strong 
coverage (high R or R2 with the longer version, or with a criterion variable such as diagnosis or 
interviewer-rated severity) while also maintaining at least that threshold of internal consistency 
(see Youngstrom, Van Meter, Frazier, Youngstrom, & Findling, 2018, for an example). If the 
intended application is progress or outcome measurement, then sensitivity to change (quantified 
as an omega-squared in a generalized linear model) would be a good counterbalancing metric.  
Simply focusing on maximizing alpha risks picking scales that are too good to be true 
when used in many contexts. Reliability estimates are a ceiling for validity, but not an estimate 
of it. Overly narrow coverage will attenuate the correlation with the construct, meaning that the 
validity may actually be much lower than the tasty-looking coefficient implies. The scale with 
broader coverage could have an equal or higher validity coefficient, despite the lower internal 
consistency. In our own work, the full length General Behavior Inventory provides extremely 
high values for Cronbach’s alpha (e.g., alpha>.92 to .96) in parent, youth, and teacher report for 
both depression and hypomanic/biphasic scores. However, one common critique was that the 
scale was onerously long for clinical use, motivating the development of various short forms and 
carved versions that showed identical or improved clinical utility despite more modest internal 
consistency estimates (.88 to .91; Youngstrom, A. Van Meter, et al., 2018). As a result, the short 
forms have been translated into the most languages, used in the most clinical trials, endorsed by 
the PhenX Tool Kit, have the largest effect sizes in meta-analyses of diagnostic accuracy 
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(Youngstrom, Egerton, et al., 2018; Youngstrom, Genzlinger, Egerton, & Van Meter, 2015) and 
are most often requested for use by clinicians. The lower alpha was not a consideration.  
Inter-Rater Reliability: >.85 Is Often Too Good to Be True  
Inter-rater reliability is often the more relevant aspect of reliability for clinical 
applications. If two different interviewers evaluated the case, would they agree about the 
diagnosis? How closely would their estimate of the severity of the problems match? Cohen’s 
kappa is the most widely used metric for agreement about categorical variables such as diagnosis 
or dichotomous estimates of treatment response. Intra-class correlations are the typical metric for 
dimensional scores (McGraw & Wong, 1996a, 1996b). Again, higher coefficients indicate better 
performance, indexed as agreement better than chance, or as variance attributed to differences 
between cases instead of between raters or random error. The prevailing rubrics typically suggest 
that values >.80 are excellent (e.g., Landis & Koch, 1977). Reviewers often are critical of papers 
that report values lower than this, suggesting that the reliability was subpar or worse. 
Investigators are pressed to document that the reliability exceeds that threshold (Brennan & 
Prediger, 1981).  
Fortunately for authors focused on the short term, due to pragmatic issues like tenure and 
promotion, or getting a grant renewed, there are many ways to whip up a batch of tasty looking 
coefficients without resorting to fraud. One is by judiciously selecting the choice of statistic. 
There is a family of intra-class correlations that use different definitions of the numerator (the 
desirable variance) and the denominator (the error variance). Two conceptual differences are the 
fixed versus random effects estimation, and consistency versus absolute agreement (McGraw & 
Wong, 1996a, 1996b). Fixed effects are appropriate when we have observed all of the possible 
levels of the variable (e.g., both biological sexes, those with or without a particular treatment 
exposure). Random effects are the better conceptual choice when we are sampling from a larger 
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universe of possibilities (e.g., gender identity, or clinical sites or therapists): They generalize 
beyond our specific raters to the larger population of potential interviewers. The random effects 
estimate will almost always be smaller than the corresponding fixed effect estimate; they could 
be tied when the variance attributable to the random factor is precisely zero. The random effects 
model would usually be the more realistic match to our research designs: We have not often 
comprehensively represented all possible variations in clinic or therapist, for example. However, 
the fixed effect model produces the larger coefficient. The typical practice is to report it, without 
clearly labeling the intraclass correlation as a fixed effect model. Ambiguously labeled ICCs are 
almost always the larger consistency value (Gruber & Weinstock, 2018).  
The agreement versus consistency distinction hinges on whether we want to track 
differences in calibration as well as differences in how we rank cases. Consistency coefficients 
focus on whether the raters rank the cases in the same order, ignoring whether there is a 
discrepancy in the average scores across raters. Spearman’s rho and Pearson’s r are examples of 
consistency metrics, and one variant of consistency intraclass correlation is identical to r. In 
contrast, absolute agreement measures include the variance between raters in the denominator, 
penalizing the coefficient for the raters being calibrated differently. Again, the best-case scenario 
would be when the variance between raters is exactly nil, and then the absolute agreement and 
consistency coefficients would be identical. Otherwise, the consistency coefficient will always 
be higher, and that is why it is the one almost always reported instead.  
If the statistic is calculated and reported accurately, is there any harm in using 
consistency instead of absolute agreement? Imagine students taking two sections of a class. The 
grades assigned by two teaching assistants have a consistency coefficient of .95 – excellent! But 
one TA’s scores average 10 points lower than the other. The consistency coefficient ignores this 
as an uninteresting source of variance. The students are not likely to agree. They would have a 
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vigorous preference for a measure of absolute agreement instead. In clinical trials, having raters 
not well calibrated contributes to differences in whom gets enrolled across raters or sites, 
reducing power to detect treatment effects by increasing error variance, and potentially adding to 
placebo response rates. When test authors only report consistency coefficients, they are 
implicitly describing a best-case scenario where differences in rater anchoring and calibration are 
nonexistent. These are rarely realistic assumptions, and they underestimate the challenges 
involved in using the assessment with new raters or in new settings.  
 There are ways that investigators can craft the research design to yield more optimistic 
reliability estimates, as well. Two examples include selecting extreme cases for the reliability 
analysis and minimizing sources of error variance much more than would be feasible in typical 
settings. Stacking the sample with extreme cases maximizes the variance between cases, 
maximizing the numerator in the reliability estimate. Judges will have an easier time 
distinguishing between severely depressed cases and healthy controls than trying to grade 
degrees of depression among a set of cases all drawn from an outpatient clinic. Similarly, if the 
goal is to maximize the reliability estimate, then having two judges code the written transcript of 
an interview will yield a higher estimate of agreement than watching a video recording, which in 
turn would be higher than if the two judges independently interviewed the same person. In all 
three scenarios, the judges would be considering the information provided verbally, but the video 
adds variance due to nonverbal behavior, and the re-interview adds variance due to differences in 
phrasing of questions, as well as interpersonal dynamics, changes over time (re-interview is 
confounded with retest stability), and a plethora of other facets. It is easier to publish the estimate 
based on coding transcripts, even though the re-interview scenario is probably the more helpful 
benchmark for how the interview would perform when generalized to another client or setting. 
Published reports do not clearly disclose the design choices, as we have learned in our efforts to 
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code these features in several meta-analyses: Fewer than 20% of published reports included the 
reliability of the scale or of the diagnostic interview (Youngstrom et al., 2015). It is safest to 
assume that when we read an inter-rater reliability coefficient value >.85 without clear details to 
the contrary, it is probably not “excellent,” but rather based on a fixed-effects, consistency 
model, and using transcripts, case notes, or audio recording rather than richer inputs, perhaps 
with selected cases. If the researchers did something else, they probably are aware that the model 
is more conservative, and definitely would know if it was more work (as a re-interview or video 
coding would be), and they would be sure to make the reader aware accordingly.  
Item Response Theory Reliability, Information Values and Theta 
Item Response Theory (IRT) models are gaining popularity because of several technical 
and practical advantages for scale building and evaluation. However, presenting and interpreting 
IRT presents its own set of challenges. Depending on the purpose of the measure and how it was 
developed, IRT reliability (information) estimates might be considered low or unacceptable by 
many researchers or reviewers. Knowing the purpose of the measure matters: Measures of 
psychopathology are particularly likely to show a pattern of fit that does not match generic 
expectations. If the measure is intended to assess the construct across the entire population and 
generate fine gradations in ability or severity, then it may be realistic to expect reliability levels 
to be >.80 from theta of -3 to +3 (where theta is the level of the underlying trait, scaled roughly 
as a z-score). However, for diagnostic measures this standard would be unrealistically harsh. 
Diagnostic measures need to have strong reliability in the region of the latent trait where the 
clinical group meets/overlaps the non-clinical group. This is often at theta ≥+1.5 to theta ≤+2.5 
or 3 (assuming higher scores indicate more pathology). Reliability levels in the .4s or .5s at 
thetas of -3 to -0 will not significantly change measure performance measure for its intended 
purpose. When the goal is detecting pathological anxiety, precise measurement of “degree of 
TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE  12 
relaxation” at the low end is not crucial. Similarly, if a measure is designed to differentiate at 
average levels of the trait – say a normal personality measure like the Big 5 – drops in reliability 
at the ends of the distribution may not impact utility enough to warrant lengthening. A 
contrasting scenario might occur when an author is trying to develop a scale for measuring 
change and reliability drops precipitously at theta=0 or lower. For measures of pathology, this 
would correspond to low accuracy about levels of the trait as the person nears remission.  
Adaptive testing approaches that use computers to choose calibrated items from a larger 
pool can obviate some of these problems. However, some measures are not suited for adaptive 
testing. For others, the necessary resources may be unavailable for development or 
implementation of adaptive frameworks. IRT reliability based estimates and changes in 
reliability across the latent trait need to be interpreted with reference to the intended use. 
Validity and Effect Sizes 
 Effect sizes provide a helpful way of thinking about findings. They move us away from 
the dichotomous thinking of null hypothesis significance testing, changing the question from yes 
or no significance to “how big is the effect?” Focusing on the size of the effect immediately 
makes things less abstract, and we are more likely to consider whether the size is plausible, and 
whether it has practical significance. The plausibility of the effect size becomes a sort of face 
validity for the finding, and often will quickly raise questions about the appropriateness of the 
research design, analyses, or reporting. We use three common effect sizes – correlation, 
standardized mean differences (SMD), and diagnostic accuracy – to illustrate when results might 
be too good to be true (Kelley & Preacher, 2012).  
Correlation 
Correlation coefficients are among the most widely used effect sizes in social and clinical 
psychology, and they are widespread in other areas as well. It is well understood that most forms 
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of correlation coefficient are bounded by values of 1.0 and -1.0, with a coefficient of zero 
indicating no association between the variables. Cohen (1988) suggested values of r ~.1, .3, and 
.5 as rough benchmarks for small, medium, and large Pearson correlations based in part on 
reviewing a year’s worth of articles in a leading journal. He stated that these were descriptive, 
not value judgments or indicators of practical significance. They were pegged to perception 
thresholds, with small effects being at the limit of what might be perceived (such as the 
difference in average height between 15 and 16 year old girls, about half an inch, expressed as a 
point-biserial correlation, p. 27), medium being .3 (about the difference between height in 14 
versus 18 year olds, or the taste of name brand products and the “no frills” substitutes my mother 
kept trying to sneak past us as kids), and large being obvious (r~.5, such as the difference in 
average intelligence between those starting college and those finishing doctorates, or the height 
again – 2 inch difference between ages 13 and 18; Cohen, 1988). He also noted that on the one 
hand, he was feeding his perceptions via a diet of peer reviewed articles that had been through 
the kitchen of peer review before appearing on the menu of the Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology – most research fare would not be so carefully prepared or refined through such 
rigorous critic reviews. On the other hand, the majority of the studies still had inadequate 
statistical power, even though they had been published (Cohen, 1962). Despite Cohen publishing 
this exposé about power in psychological research, and the paper being cited more than 1,500 
times, power remained essentially unchanged decades later (Cohen, 1992).  
“Big data” has accomplished what Cohen’s exhortations could not. Survey Monkey, 
Qualtrics, and REDCap have automated survey delivery and scoring, much as agribusiness 
automated farming. Survey panels and M-Turk took the “psychology subject pool” recipe and 
scaled it to nation-sized and always in season. Data archiving and open data policies made 
curated datasets worth hundreds of millions of dollars available for secondary analysis. Google, 
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Facebook, and web scraping changed the scale of the data by several orders of magnitude yet 
again, and the Internet of Things and wearables are adding yet more huge and deep data streams 
to the broth. With N=10,000, roughly the size of a typical epidemiological study in one of the 
repositories, power would be 90% to reject the null if the true correlation were .032 or larger 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Google is making data freely available with 
N>100,000 or millions of observations (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2017). These sample sizes make 
statistical significance trivial. Machine learning is making it possible to test larger sets of 
variables to identify the most interesting sets of predictors. This is stepwise model building 
raised on steroids, making nominal p values meaningless. Gourmands of statistical learning refer 
to this as “the curse of dimensionality,” where the computer can obligingly search through store-
fulls of model ingredients, dutifully reporting the best fit (often now operationalized as predictive 
accuracy or bias reduction). The challenge is deciding which predictors are robust and likely to 
work again in other samples (showing low variance in the coefficient, in the parlance of 
statistical learning; James et al., 2013).  
Does the size of the correlation match what was found in a prior study with the same 
variables? With data less expensive and available on unprecedented scales, a healthy research 
regimen needs to build on a pyramid of validated measurement ingredients, combined in recipes 
that make conceptual sense, with results compared to expectations at least qualitatively, although 
there are a variety of formal tests available. Steiger (1980) provided the formula for direct tests 
of two correlations or regression coefficients, either drawn from the same sample or two 
independent samples. The inputs are the two coefficients, the sample size, and the nuisance 
correlation if the coefficients are based on the same rather than the independent sample. 
Significant differences indicate that the coefficients are further apart than would likely be 
explained by sampling error. If the new coefficient is significantly higher, that would motivate 
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some careful contemplation about factors that might make it too good to be true. Differences in 
the reliability of the measures (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996), restriction of range attenuating the 
correlations (or over-dispersion amplifying them), and variations in sample composition all are 
worthy candidates that can quickly be tested via applications of simple formulae or examination 
of the enrollment procedure and sample demographics. Steiger’s test and similar methods are 
powerful complements to Cohen’s enjoinder to look for published effect sizes as the basis for 
interpretation.  
Benchmarking Results. Some topics have an extensive literature available. Agreement 
across informants is an example. Two large meta-analyses compared agreement between parents, 
youths, and teachers about the youths’ emotional and behavioral problems (Achenbach, 
McConaughy, & Howell, 1987; De Los Reyes et al., 2015), summarizing almost two thousand 
effect sizes from almost 500 samples—as ubiquitous as pizza! —both found average r=.28 
across all informants. Informant type moderates agreement. Youth ratings tended to correlate 
r~.2 with parent and teacher ratings of internalizing and about .3 about externalizing problems; 
parents and teachers agree in a similar range, and two parents rating the same child agree at the 
.5 to .6 level. The covariation across raters is a small fraction of the reliable variance in all of the 
ratings, which suggests that there might be a lot of situational specificity, dyadic patterns, or 
other systematic differences in perspective.  
The robustness of the pattern – it holds across measures, countries, and decades – means 
it provides a helpful baseline prediction. It is not a physical constant: It is possible for an 
observed correlation to be higher, especially if the scales involved are more reliable (longer) and 
or similar in terms of situation and behaviors observed. However, when correlations fall outside 
of sampling error from these benchmarks, that should spark a search for possible explanations. 
Readers and reviewers often forget how low typical agreement is about behavior, and 
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coefficients matching naïve expectancies actually would be too good to be true (see regression 
prediction formula). Conceptualizing parent-youth agreement as an inter-rater reliability task 
might lead to expecting an r~.8, or thinking that agreement should meet Cohen’s rule of thumb 
for a large effect, would create a sense of cognitive dissonance when confronted with empirical 
data. Not remembering or understanding the implications of the modest correlation has led to 
heated debates, such as discounting one perspective or another as invalid or wrong (cf. De Los 
Reyes & Kazdin, 2005), or proposing that clinical diagnoses should only be made when 
clinically significant symptoms are observed by different informants in multiple settings 
(Carlson & Dyson, 2012). 
Cohen (1988) went so far as to suggest a new effect size specifically to compare 
correlations. Cohen’s q is the difference between the Fisher’s z’ transformation of two 
correlations. The z’ transformation “stretches” the correlation so that it is not bounded at ±1.0, 
and makes it so that differences between z’ values have an interval level scaling. Cohen (1988) 
devoted a chapter in his power recipe book entirely to q.  
Method variance. When two measurements are made using the same method, then the 
scores will be correlated even if they were evaluating different constructs. Some of the variance 
in each score is due to the method of assessment, and because the two scores share the method, 
they have “shared method variance” (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 
Podsakoff, 2012). The multitrait-multimethod matrix provides a framework for thinking through 
the variance sources, which often have an additive effect. If two scales both measure depression, 
they should share variance; if they both are measured by caregiver report, then they will have a 
second helping of shared variance. When correlations look surprisingly large, shared method 
variance is often the culprit. It often is possible to ignore the labels, look at the pattern of 
correlations, and tell which informants provided subsets of scores. If the table is arranged by 
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informant, then there will be a block diagonal pattern. In situations where converging measures 
of the same trait show only moderate correlations, as is the case with cross-informant agreement 
about youth behavior, or neurocognitive and physiological measures with behavior ratings 
(Owens, Evans, & Margherio, 2020; Youngstrom & De Los Reyes, 2015), it is possible for the 
shared-method contribution to be larger than the shared-trait portion. This creates substantial 
challenges in confirmatory factor analysis, especially because large numbers of indicators are 
required for identification models specifying both method and trait factors.  
Standardized Mean Difference (Cohen's d) 
Cohen’s d, or the standardized mean difference (SMD) between two groups, is the natural 
effect size for t-tests, single degree of freedom contrasts in ANOVA, and other ways of 
comparing two groups on a continuous measure. It is scaled as a z-score, which brings with it a 
certain set of conventions. A d of zero indicates that the means were identical. A d of 1 would be 
a one standard deviation difference between the groups. Cohen used this logic to develop a set of 
non-overlap alternate effect sizes--U1, U2, U3. A d value of 1 means that the average score in 
one group fell at the 68th percentile for the other group, for example.  
By extension, this means that d values of 2 would be unusually large (2.5% of a normal 
distribution would be that extreme or more), and d>3 would be a one in a thousand event by 
chance. When we are studying psychological treatments or psychopathology correlates, effect 
sizes this large are more likely to signify a computational error, or perhaps falsification, than a 
replicable finding. We have seen these published, though. A common scenario is for authors to 
accidentally use the standard error of the mean in place of the standard deviation of the scores. 
The configuration of the output tables in SPSS make this an easy mistake to make. In a meta-
analysis, we had a couple studies reporting effect sizes of d>5.55 in a content area where the 
average effect size was 1.05 (Youngstrom et al., 2015). Even without having a meta-analysis 
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available, the d values were a red flag on their own. Checking the descriptive statistics in the 
articles revealed that they were reporting “SDs” of 3.9 and 4.9 on Achenbach T-score scales, 
where the population SD is 10. Quick algebra using the sample size confirmed that they, too, 
were reporting SE values as SDs. A quick rule of thumb: If the metric is a T (SD=10) or standard 
score (SD=15), and that effect size is greater than what would be expected from the literature, 
double check the source of the SD values.  
Cohen provided benchmarks for d, with values of .2, .5, and .8 suggested as small, 
medium, and large. These correspond to Pearson correlations of .1, .3, and .5 (after applying a 
correction for attenuation to point-biserial correlations; Rice & Harris, 2005). These were 
intended as a first approximation when published benchmarks are not available. When prior 
work provides a meaningful estimate, we can compare results in the present study to prior work 
either via confidence intervals, or a direct formal test. The N, M, and SD are sufficient statistics, 
meaning that readers and reviewers can apply the test using free online calculators. In many 
cases, getting a significant result may be cause for reflection; after analytic error and design 
artifacts are ruled out, then potential moderating variables become interesting contenders. 
Diagnostic Accuracy 
Tests of diagnostic accuracy represent a special case of bivariate statistics where the 
predictor is often continuous and the criterion is categorical. Logistic regression and receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis are methods of choice for analyzing these data, and the 
Area Under the Curve (AUC) from ROC analysis is a frequently used effect size, calibrated so 
that .50 indicates chance performance and 1.0 is the maximum, combining perfect accuracy for 
true cases (sensitivity) with perfect accuracy for true non-cases (specificity). A common rubric is 
that AUC values of .90 or higher are “excellent,” .80 or higher are “good,” .70+ are “fair”, and 
.60+ are poor, and below .60 is a “fail” (Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). However, especially 
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in the area of clinical assessment, values greater than .90 are usually too good to be true when the 
goal is generalizing to a clinical setting.  
Kraemer also pointed out that our criterion diagnoses are not perfectly reliable, and this 
imposes a ceiling on the AUC values that we can expect to observe in data. If the diagnostic 
interview is not perfectly accurate, then a good predictor will identify cases that the diagnostician 
missed, and it will correctly rule out some cases that the diagnostician mistakenly labeled. 
Students will remember the frustration of having errors on the key when their exam was marked. 
Kraemer provides the formula for estimating the ceiling. For diagnoses with kappa of .85 (an 
optimistic but plausible scenario), the upper bound AUC will be .925. Once again, observed 
AUC values above .90 look too good to be true – they would be performing near the upper limit 
of feasible accuracy given the reliability of our diagnostic tools. When seeing values in this 
range, three design features often are involved: (a) stacking the deck for a large reliability 
estimate, using extreme cases, transcripts, and consistency models as described above; (b) using 
fully structured interviews, maximizing reliability at the potential cost of clinical validity, and (c) 
maximizing the similarity of the predictor and criterion in terms of content coverage and source 
variance. A paper that had patients read the BDI questionnaire and then compared it to a doctor 
reading them similar questions (the “structured interview”) found >98% accuracy (Steer, 
Cavalieri, Leonard, & Beck, 1999), which obviously is too good to be true as an estimate of how 
the questionnaire administration would predict more clinically valid and generalizable diagnoses.  
Design issues that inflate the effect size are often the culprit. Including healthy controls in 
the sample will add a lot of cases with extremely low scores on measures of psychopathology. 
These cases will all score below a reasonable threshold on the measure, boosting the diagnostic 
specificity with cases that are easy to identify (Youngstrom et al., 2015). A similar source of bias 
would be exclusion of comorbid cases or diagnostic groups that would produce overlapping 
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neurocognitive or behavioral patterns. Studies that compared cases with bipolar disorder to cases 
with ADHD but no comorbid mood disorder or healthy age-mates produce much larger AUCs 
estimates (well in excess of .90; e.g., Tillman & Geller, 2005) for many scales, only to shrink 
precipitously when applied in more diagnostically mixed samples where everyone is seeking 
treatment (Youngstrom, Meyers, Youngstrom, Calabrese, & Findling, 2006). The more 
conservative scenario is the better representation of how the measure would fare at a clinic where 
everyone is seeking help, and there are many different presenting problems and variations of 
comorbidity all in the sample. Most papers currently touting imaging, gene, or blood tests as 
diagnostic measures hinge on comparing healthy controls to well defined target groups, not a 
clinically generalizable design (e.g., Rocha-Rego et al., 2014; Woodruff, El-Mallakh, & 
Thiruvengadam, 2011; see Zeier et al., 2018 for review). The simple heuristics are to be 
suspicious when we see AUC > .90, and to ask, does the sample look like the people with whom 
I would want to use the measure (Jaeschke, Guyatt, & Sackett, 1994)? The more clinically 
complex the setting, and the more different the demographics, the more that we should expect 
the effect size to shrink (Konig et al., 2007). Internal cross-validation is not a substitute for 
finding data that closely resemble where we will need to use the measure (Youngstrom, 
Halverson, Youngstrom, Lindhiem, & Findling, 2018). 
Comparing AUCs. With time and motivation, we can use more formal methods to 
decide whether the result differs from expectation. There are methods for comparing the AUC to 
published results, as well as more powerful methods for head-to-head comparison when the data 
are available. Web sites and R packages make it possible to use many of these tests even when 
the raw data are not available. It also is easy to convert AUC to Cohen’s d, and vice versa. 
Converting Cohen’s d benchmarks into AUC values provides a more realistic rubric for 
evaluating test performance in applied contexts (Rice & Harris, 2005). In addition, there are 
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techniques to test the difference in the AUC values drawn from different samples, as well as 
more powerful options when comparing predictors in the same sample (e.g., (DeLong, DeLong, 
& Clarke-Pearson, 1988; Hanley & McNeil, 1983; Venkatraman, 2000). It also is simple to 
convert d to r, and thence to z’. These are available in free software, including R packages (e.g., 
Robin et al., 2011) and web sites with programmed spreadsheets 
(https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Evidence_based_assessment/ROC_Party/Ready_to_ROC). The AUC 
and the standard error are sufficient statistics to be able to get a formal comparison of the new 
estimates with the old benchmark.  
Reflections on Quality Checklists. There are a variety of checklists that are now 
available for assessment, treatment, and various other research designs, as well as corresponding 
lists to evaluate the quality of the reporting in published reports. The first are intended for the 
chef who wants to prepare a competent offering that will pass inspection. The second type is 
more built for the reviewer, auditor, or a food critic to check systematically that the standards are 
met. Both tend to be more detailed than could easily be used by general consumers, who need 
something more concise and focused on the information that would change validity to the point 
that it changes choices. The STAndardized Reporting of Diagnostic tests (STARD) guidelines 
list 25 items (Bossuyt et al., 2003), one of which we have not yet seen reported in any 
psychology article, and many of which are rarely reported. In our meta-analyses to date, total 
quality score has been unrelated to the effect size (Youngstrom, Egerton, et al., 2018; 
Youngstrom et al., 2015). However, several of the key ingredients independently do predict the 
validity coefficient. Using “distilled” samples that include artificially purified test groups has 
been a robust predictor tainting the results (Youngstrom, Egerton, et al., 2018; Youngstrom et al., 
2015; Youngstrom et al., 2006), much like finding a bug in the soup. Rather than expecting 
readers to routinely conduct a 25 step review on every meal, focusing attention on some key 
TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE  22 
indicators may lead to faster improvements. We also have noted no change in the quality of 
designs or reporting in the decades before versus after the introduction of the STARD guidelines, 
with average scores hovering in the high 70s (passing, but unimpressive), suggesting that there 
may be a problem of implementation.  
Model Fit Statistics 
Confirmatory models offer an opportunity to compare the fit between the parameter 
estimates implied by the model versus what is observed in the data. Much effort has been 
focused on creating and evaluating different fit statistics (Maydeu-Olivares, 2013). There are 
absolute fit measures, such as the Goodness of Fit Index and Adjusted GFI, which are scaled so 
that 1.0 is the maximum; we can think of these as multivariate analogs to R-squared in terms of 
describing covariance reproduced by the model. The RMSEA is another measure of absolute fit, 
albeit scaled so that lower values indicate better fit, and zero would be perfect (Kelley & 
Preacher, 2012). There also are model comparison fit statistics, either anchored to a conceptual 
null model (e.g., CFI, TLI), or designed to compare empirical models to each other in terms of fit 
and parsimony (e.g., Akaike Information Criterion, Bayesian Information Criterion, and 
derivatives; see Raftery, 1995). 
We need these to compare competing models, and to decide whether a model provides a 
good balance between parsimony and fit. Because of sampling variability, even a correctly 
specified model that holds in the population will not fit perfectly in a sample (Burnham & 
Anderson, 2016; Preacher & Merkle, 2012). It is helpful to remember that global fit statistics 
indicate only average model fit, and they do not also indicate the model’s explanatory power, nor 
person-level fit and the accuracy of predictions for individual cases (Preacher & Merkle, 2012).  
Often we focus almost exclusively on global model fit, treating the statistics as if there 
were a cutoff for good fit (e.g., CFI>.95; Hu & Bentler, 1995), or we report a suite of fit statistics 
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and focus the attention on the ones most favorable to our preferred model. We develop “fit 
statistic tunnel vision,” where we do not go outside staring at the fit indices to see where the 
model is miss-specified, or even whether the parameter estimates make sense (Kline, 2016). 
When authors or reviewers focus first on fit, that can create conundrums where reasonable 
models get rejected in favor of those that are overfit – introducing bias in parameter estimates, 
and also increasing the likelihood of future replication efforts failing. A high profile example of 
this is the WISC-5, where the model selected based on fit indices produces a factor loading 
higher than 1.0 – as reported in the technical manual! (Wechsler, 2014).  
Remedies include having a strong foundation of exploratory models before moving to 
confirmatory mode, testing across different sets of indicators as well as samples to improve 
understanding of the concept space as well as the measurement models. Newer approaches to 
evaluating models also look at piecewise fit, rather than focusing solely on global fit, and 
emphasize the interpretability of the parameter estimates. This is true in IRT (Maydeu-Olivares, 
2013; Thissen, 2013) as well as covariance structure modeling (Kline, 2016).  
Meta-Analysis and Credibility 
Meta-analysis is well-suited for identifying results that are too good to be true. Cohen 
(1992) called it one of the few bright spots he had seen develop in the field during his career. The 
simplest versions gather the effect sizes, convert them to a consistent metric, and then test them 
for homogeneity. Cochran’s Q statistic and funnel plots are examples of well-established 
statistical and graphical ways of looking for outliers. Estimates that fall outside the confidence 
interval for the meta-analytic summary are outliers likely to have different factors influencing 
their result.  
Meta-analysis also can model variables that might explain heterogeneity in observed 
effect sizes. The most general model would be meta-regression, which can incorporate 
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continuous or categorical predictors (referred to as “moderators” in the meta-analytic parlance, 
because they are changing the size of effect sizes that usually summarize a relationship between 
two other variables). When doing a meta-regression, sample values that fall outside the 
residualized funnel plot, or that have large Studentized deleted residuals, would be outliers that 
warrant detailed scrutiny (Viechtbauer, 2010).  
In our own efforts to test moderators, we generate two sets of candidates. One is a list of 
substantively interesting, often hypothesis driven variables, such as differences in informant 
(Youngstrom et al., 2015) or content coverage (Youngstrom, Egerton, et al., 2018). The other is a 
set of design features, including ones mentioned above. Using distilled samples and having 
shared source variance between the predictor and the criterion are two that often have a big 
impact on the flavor of the result. In contrast, the influence of p-hacking (Head et al., 2015) or 
differences in reference time period for scales tends to be relatively subtle.  
When conducting a meta-analysis, we encourage the authors to review and discuss the 
outliers and identify potential contributing factors. At a minimum, such speculation could inform 
future studies and reviews. It may be possible to find enough similar studies to code the 
suspicious variable as a new candidate moderator for a supplemental or exploratory analysis. For 
consumers of the literature, meta-analyses provide a valuable sense of the typical distribution of 
effect sizes, helping us recognize when new results fall more in the realm of skepticism than 
credibility.  
Recommendations 
 In keeping with the Evidence Based Updates series, we provide recommendations for 
next actions as well as re-calibrated expectations for evaluating assessment tools and practices 
(De Los Reyes & Langer, 2018).  
Researchers 
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When we are in the mode of designing a new project, we can select high quality 
ingredients. These include investing in better assessments – picking the ones likely to have high 
validity, investing as much as possible in training and adherence, and using planning checklists 
to look for opportunities to enhance quality and report it accurately. The results are likely to be 
more sustaining when built around a simple recipe with a priori goals. Cohen’s (1992) 
admonition to focus on fewer variables is worth remembering as a counterbalance to present 
enthusiasm for statistical learning models. Curating the candidate predictors on the basis of prior 
literature, theory, and psychometrics will be a good fusion of styles.  
Authors can choose their effect size to improve consumption by the intended audience. 
Effect sizes can be converted between each other. The choice should combine familiarity (e.g., r 
and d are staples in psychology; NNT and LHH are more exotic imports from evidence-based 
medicine; Straus, Glasziou, Richardson, & Haynes, 2011), match with purpose (e.g., AUC for 
diagnostic studies, SMD for group comparisons, and r for regression-type analyses), and ease of 
interpretation. Effect sizes that have an asymptote and non-interval scale properties can be hard 
to compare. Odds ratios are well known case in point (e.g., 0.1 and 10 are of the same 
magnitude, and the distance from 2.0 to 4.0 means considerably more than from 102.0 to 104.0), 
but correlation and AUC also are harder to compare as they get larger, and it also can be tough to 
judge the practical importance of smaller values (Rosenthal, 1991). Cohen’s d has many 
advantages as a metric, and may often be worth using as the primary or supplementary 
presentation format (Rice & Harris, 2005).  
Authors can also be clear when doing effectiveness work or selecting more conservative 
and generalizable models. It is legitimate to suggest that the reader apply a different rule of 
thumb, e.g., “Because we are using clinically realistic comparison groups, we believe an AUC of 
.80 (or d=1.2) is a good target, rather than a .90 that usually has only been achieved by studies 
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with distilled cohorts in this content area” (e.g., Salcedo et al., 2017). This is not the same thing 
as lazily using convenience samples and whatever variables are laying around. There can be skill 
applied to archival and big data; a good chef can use principles to work with the ingredients at 
hand to deliver a memorable and satisfying meal. Efficacy paradigms are testing whether we 
could get the hypothesized result with the premium ingredients and intensive resources; 
effectiveness is adapting and improvising based on principles, and picking ingredients that are 
essential and can scale. Like a good army cook, dissemination and implementation research 
pushes for thinking about how to feed hundreds quickly, keeping them working under 
challenging conditions.  
 Researchers should consider generalizability and replication, even when doing 
exploratory research. The better the documentation and the more that the methods are selected 
with an eye towards reproducibility, the better the odds of replication. The Open Science 
Framework (OSF.io) is a free option for posting the code to run the analyses, or a detailed 
supplement with the technical specifications of the models (see also Code Ocean, and badges for 
open materials, code, or data from the Association for Psychological Science). The resulting 
research is likely to have more utility, as validity is a prerequisite, and it will have a longer shelf 
life and citation history.  
Peer Reviewers 
Embracing the perspective that we advocate also has several implications for peer 
reviewers. Reviewers are positioned to push authors for better reporting. Ask for more details 
about the reliability methods and analyses. Nudge authors to report more clinically useful effect 
sizes, and to compare them to benchmarks based on prior work, meta-analyses, or reasonable 
predictions from conceptual models. Consider the implications of design features such as shared 
method variance or reliance on healthy controls as a comparison group, and encourage authors to 
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mention the implications in the discussion section. Know rules of thumb for statistical analyses 
(van Belle, 2002) and benchmark values for the relevant literature, or make a habit of looking for 
them (e.g., search for meta-analyses). Fact check the results, especially if they seem improbable, 
using free software to estimate power or effect sizes, or to recalculate statistics. 
At the same time, progress will likely be faster if reviewers complement the push for 
better reporting with recalibrated standards that acknowledge the trade-offs inherent in more 
generalizable designs. Effectiveness work fundamentally involves less internal validity than 
efficacy designs, and it also provides a more realistic sense of how the findings are likely to 
translate into practice. It would be helpful to explicitly match the calibration of the review with 
the intended audience. It would be absurd to conduct a James Beard review of the food 
preparation and presentation of a corner stand burger, whereas a simple five-star rating system, 
perhaps combined with key indicators about cleanliness and price, are often enough to make 
informed decisions. From a dissemination perspective, more people will get fed via burgers than 
Michelin-rated meals, too. Methodologists will be able to offer more balanced and useful 
critiques when they consider generalizability, calibrate their review appropriately, and nudge 
authors to be equally frank and realistic in evaluating the generalizability.  
Requiring conventional rules of thumb paradoxically creates incentives to use weaker 
designs and statistical methods with unrealistic assumptions (e.g., consistency and fixed effects 
models). When sketchy results flood the market, it becomes harder for stronger designs and more 
accurately labeled reports to get accepted. Reviewers can help by not penalizing papers that are 
using more conservative and generalizable methods. Remembering that reliability is necessary 
for validity, do not penalize a paper for reporting a lower reliability coefficient based on a more 
generalizable model, especially if the paper still produced significant and meaningful results. 
Reliability is a prerequisite, not the end goal in most studies.  
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Readers and Consumers 
Balance is key: On the one hand, exceptional results require exceptional support, and we 
should need to be persuaded; on the other hand, well executed and generalizable clinical studies 
will require a different calibration for evaluation. If the results amount to a miracle cure, or an 
assessment that will bring crystal clarity where all was fog before, then the results are probably 
too good to be true. We need to be familiar with key ways of deciding quickly whether the 
research is valid and likely to apply to the cases where we would need to make choices based on 
the results. Not all that is gold will glitter, and a lot that appears shiny fades rapidly in practice. A 
wry joke in Evidence Based Medicine is, “hurry and use the new drug before the next research 
studies come out” and the effect size shrinks (Silverman, 1998). We need to retrain our tastes to 
prefer more humble but realistic results. 
General Conclusion: Think in Terms of Prediction 
A powerful heuristic that all stakeholders can use is to make a prediction about the effect 
size or result ahead of time, write it down, and then compare the prediction to the finding. The 
act of making the prediction and expressing it in the form of an effect size (or an expected value 
for the test statistic) refines our thinking into a precise operational definition of the expectancy. It 
organizes our consideration of design and sample characteristics, as well as external benchmarks 
from prior studies and reviews. Writing it down takes but a moment, and it prevents any lazy, 
“Oh, yes, that is about what I expected” HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known) 
(Kerr, 1998). Comparing the prediction and the observation provides feedback that helps us learn 
and calibrate for the future (Meehl, 1973), as well as stimulating critical thinking about the case 
in point. It is possible to formalize the process, using Bayesian methods to combine the prior 
estimate with the new information (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018; Kruschke, 2011); but even 
leaving that aside, making a quantitative prediction and then comparing it to potentially 
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confirming or disconfirming data is a fast and free cognitive heuristic that will improve our 
interpretation of findings and decision making in general (Croskerry, 2003; Jenkins & 
Youngstrom, 2016).  
Because effect sizes are convertible, it is possible to combine multiple ones in the same 
report, pairing a familiar one with another that facilitates comparison. Thinking in terms of effect 
sizes also moves us away from black and white thinking and towards focusing on the application 
of the results and how context might influence generalization. Cohen laid out a formal process 
for testing for differences between effect sizes, where q = z’(observed) – z’(expected). Our suggested 
rules of thumb would be that (a) if the effect size converted to a z’ is greater than .8 (see Table 
2), it is probably too good to be true for a diagnostic test (e.g., AUC ~.9), a clinical outcome 
(d~1.8), or a convergent correlation (r=.67); and (b) if the q>.30 comparing the observed result 
to a reasonable benchmark, then it again may be too good to be true. A discrepancy this big 
would mean finding a large effect when a medium would have been expected, or a medium 
effect when a small would be plausible. Cohen (1988, p. 115) chose q ~.3 as a “medium-sized” 
discrepancy, so our rule of thumb translates to “When an analysis shows a result that is better 
than expected to a medium or larger degree, pause and reflect.” 
Healthier research reporting will be more nourishing but will be an acquired taste. 
Bayesian enthusiasts often offer a radical reworking of how we approach statistical analysis built 
around prediction. It definitely would address many of the short comings of our current practices, 
but it is a vegan cleanse or a ketogenic diet, so different that most consumers are unlikely to be 
able to switch quickly and sustain the change, even though it delivers results. We offer a 
pragmatic emphasis on making smarter choices one meal at a time, and encourage peer-to-peer 
support and accountability. As we wean ourselves from sugary kappas, distilled AUCs >.9, and 
high-sodium alphas, we will need to remind ourselves and each other that the results will be 
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better for the field in terms of both generalizability and reproducibility.   
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Table 1 
Association between scale length, average inter-item correlation, and Cronbach’s alpha.  
 
 Number of Items on Scale (k) 
Average 
Item r 50 40 30 25 20 15 10 5 
.10 .85 .82 .77 .74 .69 .63 .53 .36 
.15 .90 .88 .84 .82 .78 .73 .64 .47 
.20 .93 .91 .88 .86 .83 .79 .71 .56 
.25 .94 .93 .91 .89 .87 .83 .77 .63 
.30* .96 .94 .93 .91 .90 .87 .81 .68 
.35 .96 .96 .94 .93 .92 .89 .84 .73 
.40 .97 .96 .95 .94 .93 .91 .87 .77 
.45 .98 .97 .96 .95 .94 .92 .89 .80 
.50 .98 .98 .97 .96 .95 .94 .91 .83 
.55 .98 .98 .97 .97 .96 .95 .92 .86 
.60 .99 .98 .98 .97 .97 .96 .94 .88 
.65 .99 .99 .98 .98 .97 .97 .95 .90 
.70 .99 .99 .99 .98 .98 .97 .96 .92 
 
 
Note. “Excellent” values of alpha >= .90 (bold line) could be achieved by long scales with even 
though they might include items measuring heterogeneous constructs, and would require inter-
item correlations > .6 for short forms often used in applied settings.   
*The italicized row shows how picking a moderate target for item correlation, such as average r 
~.3, would produce a sliding scale of alpha values depending on scale length. 
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Table 2 
Comparison of four common effect sizes and conventions.  
r d AUC Fisher z' 
.000 .000 .500 .000 
.100 S .200 S .556 .100 
.200 .408 .614 .203 
.243 .500 M .638 .248 
.300 M .629 .672 .310 
.350 .747 .700 S .365 
.371 .800 L .714 .390 
.400 .873 .731 .424 
.500 L 1.155 .793 .549 
.514 1.198 .800 M .568 
.600 1.500 .856 .693 
.670 1.805 .900 L .811 
.700 1.960 .917 .867 
.800 2.667 .970 1.099 
.900 4.129 .998 1.472 
.950 6.085 1.000 1.832 
.990 14.036 1.000 2.647 
Note. Boldfaced coefficients represent common rules of thumb for small, medium, and large 
effects. Coefficients above z’ values of .8 may be too good to be true, and warrant critical 
evaluation in most clinical applications, unless they are reliability coefficients. Similarly, 
coefficients with z’ values more than .3 higher than expected also deserve scrutiny of the design, 
analyses, and reporting. 
 
 
